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Kiesewetter, Kant, and the Problem of 
Poetic Beauty 
My observations here are meant to address a current lacuna in discussions of 
Kant's aesthetics, namely the beauty of poetry. There are, I admit, numerous 
treatments of poetry considered in the light of Kant's aesthetic theory, but what 
may not be noticed is that in discussions of poetry and Kant's aesthetics, the topic 
of poetic beauty only rarely comes up (a perusal of the relevant literature will 
quickly confirm this). 
This virtual silence on the beauty of poetry is surprising, given that the 
beautiful (along with the sublime) is obviously one of the two foundational aes­
thetic categories in Kant's aesthetics. This silence stands out all the more given 
that Kant himself explicitly mentions that poems can be beautiful and further­
more declares poetry to be the highest form of fine art. Why, then, is the beauty of 
poetry almost never discussed in relation to Kant's aesthetics? Ultimately, I will be 
arguing that this silence on the beauty of poetry is a motivated one, albeit an 
unintentionally motivated one, namely because Kant's conception of free beauty 
militates against its being applied to poetry (and the same holds, by extension, for 
literature in general). In other words, this lacuna in discussions of Kant's aes­
thetics rests on a lacuna in the field of products of fine art to which the Kantian 
conception of free beauty can be applied. At the same time, my impression is that 
the fact that free beauty in its Kantian sense is almost impossible to apply to 
poetry has been overlooked principally because Kant himself overlooks it; in 
addition, interpreters of Kant may well independently overlook it for the same 
reasons that Kant apparently did. 
1 Kiesewetter's Critik der Urtheilskraft fiir 
Uneingeweihte 
One of the few texts to touch so directly on the question of beauty and poetry from 
a Kantian perspective is Johann Gottfried Karl Christian Kiesewetter's Immanuel 
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Kant's Critik der Urtheilskraft fUr Uneingeweihte of 1804.1 Manfred Kuehn, in his 
recent biography of Kant, describes Kiesewetter in the following terms: 
Kant was still the most famous philosopher of the Albertina, and some came to study with 
him. One of his most important students during this period was Johann Gottfried Karl Kie­
sewetter (1766 -1819), who was in the fall of 1788 sent to Konigsberg by Frederick William II 
himself so that "he could benefit from Kant's oral instructions." [ ... J Kiesewetter adored Kant, 
frequently referring to him as his "second father in later times." Beginning with his Grundriss 
der reinen allgemeinen Logik nach Kantischen Grundsiitzen (1791), he became an ardent po­
pularizer of Kant's philosophy.' 
After such a generally glowing description, Kiesewetter's treatment at the hands 
of Erich Adickes may come as a surprise. Adickes, in his annotated Kant bib­
liography, has this to say about Kiesewetter: 
Kiesewetter is the prototype of those unconditional disciples, who swear by the words of 
their master. Every school-philosophy, at the time of its floret, produces them in scores. They 
possess no thoughts of their own[.J 
As for his writings, Adickes goes on to say: 
Kiesewetter's work is one of those which, although useful for the propagation of philosophic 
thought, - it was even translated into Danish, - are of more disadvantage than advantage to 
science itself, in that they win a mass of incompetent adherents for a school of philosophy, 
and this too at the cost of a superficializing of its problems and their solutions, i. e., at the cost 
of philosophical import. [ ... J All that these "Uneingeweihte" could hope to attain to, was the 
recognition of the Kantian philosophy among the other constituents of a 'general education'; 
- subjects on which they had read something, and which they could therefore converse 
about.3 
In effect, Adickes's complaint is that Kiesewetter's book on Kant's third Critique is 
nothing other than an early 19th-century equivalent (avant la lettre) of Kant's 
Third Critique for Dummies or The Idiot's Guide to Kant's Critique of Judgment, a 
book which could block a newcomer from truly understanding Kant's third Cri-
1 Kiesewetter, J. G. c.: Immanuel Kant's Critik der Urtheilskraft filr Uneingeweihte, aUf eine faj3liche 
Art dargestellt. Berlin 1804. 
2 Kuehn, Manfred: Kant: A Biography. Cambridge 2001, 359 -340. 
3 Adickes, Erich: Bibliography of Writings by and on Kant Which Have Appeared in Germany up to 
the End of1887 (Part III). In: The Philosophical Review 2/5 (1893), 557-583, 576 and 578 (entries 462 
and 467). This serial bibliography was later printed on its own in 1896; in that edition, these same 
entries can be found on 82 and 84. Ernst Cassirer makes similar remarks. Cassirer, Ernst. Kant's 
Life and Thought. Trans!. James Haden. New Haven/London 1981, 380. 
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tique in the first place. On the assumption that Adickes is correct about Kiese­
wetter, it would seem that there could be little reason to return to the pages of 
Kiesewetter's Critik der Urtheilskraft filr Uneingeweihte after it had already sunken 
into obscurity. I would argue, however, that, in its heavy application of poetry to 
illustrate Kant's theory of beauty, Kiesewetter's third Critique book makes the 
problematic nature of poetic beauty in Kant hard to overlook. 
Kiesewetter correctly points out that the representational arts are mainly ju­
dged for dependent, rather than free beauty, and that the judgment that a work 
displays dependent beauty does not necessarily mean that it will also be judged to 
have free beauty. In a section subtitled, "On the Two Main Types of Beauty, Free 
and Dependent" ["Von den beiden Hauptarten der Sch6nheit, der freien und der 
anhangenden"], Kiesewetter writes that we must first of all 
set out a principal distinction regarding beauty which has an essential influence on the 
character of the judgment of taste itself; the distinction concerns free (self-subsistent) and 
dependent (conditioned) beauty (pulchritudo vaga and adhaerens). [ ... ] In the case of de­
pendent beauty, the question of perfection (correctness) is presupposed, and when precisely 
the incorrectness does damage to the beauty, then beauty and perfection are to be completely 
distinguished from each other, and the latter [viz., perfection] is not always accompanied by 
the former [viz., beauty]. [ ... ] Thus the judgment of dependent beauty intimately ties together 
two judgments, of which that about perfection or correctness comes first, and that about 
beauty follows.4 
So far, so good. As can be seen, here Kiesewetter simply discusses poetry along 
with the other representational arts. On the next page, however, he makes the 
striking observation that poetry and the literary arts cannot be judged according to 
free beauty: 
only one kind of fine art, spoken art, by its essence makes it impossible to offer free beauties, 
for words are nothing other than signs of our presentations, and speech is not possible 
without concepts; thus in the case of the each and every product of speech, the under-
4 "einen Hauptunterschied der Schonheit bekannt machen, der auf die Beschaffenheit der Ge­
schmackurteile selbst einen wesentlichen Einfluss hat; dieser Unterschied betrift die freie (fUr 
sich bestehende) and anhangende (bedingte) Schonheit (pulchritudo vaga und adhaerens). [ ... ] 
Bei der anhangenden Schonheit wird die Frage nach Vollkommenheit (Richtigkeit) vorausgesetzt, 
und wenn gleich die Unrichtigkeit der Schonheit Abbruch thut, so sind doch Schonheit und 
Vollkommenheit wohl voneinander zu unterscheiden, und die letztere fUhrt nicht immer die 
erstere bei sich. [ ... ] Es sind also bei dem Urtheil tiber anhangende Schonheit zwei Urtheile innig 
zusammen verbunden, von welchem das tiber Vollkommenheit oder Richtigkeit vorangeht, und 
das tiber Schonheit folgt." Kiesewetter, J. G. c.: Immanuel Kant's Critik der Urtheilskraft fur Un­
eingeweihte. Berlin 1804, SIf. 
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standing makes a demand for correctness, i.e., agreement with that which it is supposed to 
be.5 
Kiesewetter argues that the art forms which are dependent upon speech simply 
cannot be judged according to their free beauty because speech necessarily 
communicates concepts, and without concepts, it is no longer even speech. In 
such a case, he seems to suggest, the spoken arts would altogether lose their very 
medium, namely speech. 
What is perhaps even more striking, and - I would argue - instructive, given 
Kiesewetter's stern warning that it is impossible for the spoken arts to be judged 
according to free beauty, is that, just pages later, he begins a long chain of 
examples of the beauty of poetry! Granted, he introduces this chain of poetic 
examples - meant to illustrate varieties of "mixed" beauty, where the poet adds an 
emotion to beauty - with the warning that "Since works of spoken fine art cannot 
be free beauties, in the judgment about them the judgment about correctness is 
therefore always mixed, ,,6 but even this formulation, turning as it does on the idea 
of "mixed" beauty, seems to suggest that free beauty is there, merely that de­
pendent beauty or charm and emotion is 'mixed' in along with it. 
At any rate, he then, after briefly touching on a poem by Schiller which 
pleases the listener due to its charming sounds, turns to a poem from Matthison 
which mixes suaveness or loveliness with beauty (55 f.). Here one immediately 
wants to point out to Kiesewetter that, by writing the single word Schonheit (in this 
and other cases), he has left open the question of whether he here means free or 
dependent beauty. Of course, if he is consistent with the remarks he has just made, 
then he must mean dependent beauty. This example is then followed by many 
pieces of poetry illustrating various mixtures that one can make: beauty (free or 
dependent?) mixed with emotion, the sublime, conviction, religious feeling, 
moral feeling, etc. (57-76). 
Kiesewetter's diagram of Kant's division of the arts (412) makes visible the 
uniqueness of poetry and the literary arts or arts of speech on Kant's conception: 
The spoken arts are cut off from the other arts insofar as the other arts express 
5 "nur eine Art der schonen Kunst, die redende, macht es ihrem Wesen nach unmoglich, freie 
Schonheiten aufzustellen, denn Worte sind nichts als Zeichen unserer Vorstellungen, und Rede ist 
ohne Begriffe nicht moglich; der Verstand macht also bei einem jeden Produkt der Rede die 
Anforderung der Richtigkeit d. h. der Zusammenstimmung mit dem, was es sein solI." Kiesewetter, 
J. G. c.: Immanuel Kant's Critik der Urtheilskraft filr Uneingeweihte. Berlin 1804, 53. 
6 "Da die Werke der redenden schonen Ktinste keine freien Schonheiten sein konnen, so ist in 
dem Urtheil tiber dieselbe das Urtheil tiber Richtigkeit stets eingemischt." Kiesewetter, J. G. c.: 
Immanuel Kant's Critik der Urtheilskraft filr Uneingeweihte. Berlin 1804, 55. 
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intuitions (Anschauungen), or spatio-temporal forms, whereas the spoken arts 
express thoughts or conceptual content. This is the real problem: poetry does not 
use spatio-temporal shapes as its medium (or, to put it more mildly: exactly how 
or to what degree poetry uses or does not use spatio-temporal form has to be 
clarified). 
If we take seriously Kiesewetter's claim that poetry and the spoken arts 
cannot be judged according to Kantian free beauty, at least one striking cons­
equence follows. Namely, if Poesie is used as a general term to refer to all the fine 
arts (through its indicating the "crafting" or "making" of art via poiesis/poema, 
403 f.), and yet the spoken arts do not allow for a free judgment of beauty, then the 
result appears to be that, of all the arts, poetry cannot aspire to be Poesie. 
2 Kant and the Critique of Judgment 
What we have seen so far rests mostly on Kiesewetter. But what of Kant? Even if we 
assume that some of the difficulties raised by Kiesewetter's work rest on Kiese­
wetter's inconsistent or unclear formulations (particularly in his treatment of 
"mixed" beauty), the question remains, does Kant's aesthetic theory suffer from 
the threat of a similar lacuna, namely that regarding the free beauty of poetry? I 
would argue yes. (Given the constraints of space here, my argument will have to be 
very compressed.) 
One might argue against Kiesewetter that one can abstract from the meaning 
of the words in poetry, opening up the possibility for finding free beauty in its 
Kantian sense in poetry (though I think experience shows that this abstraction is, 
in fact, all but impossible). Even if this possibility were granted, however, and one 
attempted to focus merely on the intuitions which poetry offers - the structures of 
sound over time (at least insofar as it is read aloud) -, I would still argue that we 
are left with a problem. 
Namely, on the assumption that the pattern of phonemes and / or rhythm of 
syllables in a poem is not appealing to the listener merely due to its charm (always 
a possibility), then the question remains: can those phonetic and rhythmic pat­
terns provide enough structure, variety, and complexity to occasion a judgment of 
free beauty, beauty in the specifically Kantian sense? 
One might argue that, given the number of phonemes in a particular language 
(say, the approximately 44 phonemes in English), they could function just as 
musical notes do; one does not require many pitches of tone to be able to cons­
truct a beautiful melody. By analogy, one could argue, 44 phonemes offer more 
than enough material for a phonetic "melody" to be constructed. However, the 
evidence of the arts themselves seems to speak against this possibility. 
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Namely, the spoken arts are the one art form that has not had a successful 
career merely as an abstract or "absolute" art form. Even though figurative pa­
inting (admittedly in many cases an occasion principally for dependent beauty) 
still finds a substantial audience alongside abstract painting, and in some con­
texts is preferred to abstract painting, abstract painting (or at least, decorative 
forms) still have a universal appeal. Likewise for music and sculpture. But, even 
though the attempt was made with sound poetry, mere spoken sounds without 
either a linguistic meaning or a truly musical melody has never caught on in any 
lasting way. Even though much or even most poetry is expressly composed with an 
attention to its acoustic materiality, practically no one enjoys listening to such 
poetry if they cannot understand the words (and poetry in an unknown language 
would be an ideal case of having only the sounds at one's disposal). Therefore it 
seems that the acoustic form of poetry is not enough to sustain the mental play 
necessary to occasion a judgment of free beauty. Of course, as with Kiesewetter, in 
spite of this seeming prohibition, Kant speaks numerous times of poetic beauty or 
of beauty in the context of the spoken arts. And this seeming contradiction raises 
questions. 
3 Final Caveats and Considerations 
What I am not doing here is claiming that Kant's third Critique cannot serve as the 
basis for a rich and insightful engagement with poetry or the issues that poetry 
involves. I am also not claiming that Kant's specific discussion of poetry lacks any 
resources to deal with and evaluate poetry. Indeed, if one wished to use Kant's 
aesthetic theory, and his discussion of poetry itself, to grapple with poetry, one 
would find much to work with, such as his concepts of dependent beauty, the 
sublime, spirit, aesthetic ideas, and artistic creativity, as well as his discussions of 
poetic tone, rhythm, and mood. 
I am furthermore not declaring that poetry is basically ineligible for a judg­
ment of free beauty for the specific reason that (as some have it), on Kant's theory, 
no variety of art could occasion a judgment of free beauty.? My position is that, on 
Kant's theory, painting, music, sculpture, etc., can occasion a judgment of free 
beauty, but poetry and other literary art forms do not. 
7 For a discussion of some of these concerns, see the section entitled, "Natural Beauty and Fine 
Art, New Criticism, and Formalism" in Kemal, Salim: Kant's Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction. 
New York '1997, 145 -151. 
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Finally, I am also fully aware that it is basic to Kant's theory that beauty 
cannot be guaranteed or disallowed on the basis of rules. Therefore, when I make 
the claim that poetry does not occasion a judgment of free beauty, I am not de­
claring a hard and fast rule, but instead pointing out that, by the very nature of the 
beast, poetry generally militates against its being an occasion for a judgment of 
pure beauty. 
These are the options we are left with: 
1.) Kant was fully aware that poetry could only be considered in terms of de­
pendent beauty, but, because this limitation was so obvious, he neglected to 
mention it, assuming that the reader would always read "beauty" to mean 
"dependent beauty" when used in discussions of poetry. 
2.) Kant, though his own theory in effect rules it out, mistakenly assumes that the 
free beauty of poetry can be discussed because he is either unaware of the 
implications of his theory in this particular ramification, or he - temporarily 
lapsing into the general presupposition that, if any art form is beautiful, then 
above all poetry is beautiful - forgets the implications of his theory in this 
regard. 
My whole discussion of Kant on poetry, especially insofar as it utilizes Kiese­
wetter, admittedly begins on the basis of a surface reading of Kant's Critique of 
Judgment. If the present analysis is correct, then it has to be admitted that, so far 
as the literal, surface, or technical meaning of Kant's words are concerned, the 
free beauty of poetry presents a problem. Some possible responses to this problem 
are the following: 
1.) One "bites the bullet" and admits that Kant's theory of free beauty cannot be 
applied to poetry (and, by extension, to the other literary arts). Granted, if this 
first option is accepted, then numerous absurd consequences result, chief of 
which is that poetry, for Kant the highest of the arts, does not admit of being 
called "beautiful" in his specific sense of the term. 
2.) One accepts this surface reading as the correct reading of Kant's theory of free 
beauty, but then goes on to argue that the material, spatio-temporal form 
presented by poetry (its pattern of phonemes, or its rhythmic structure, or 
both) are more complex and 'playful' than they might at first appear (and 
thereby could occasion a judgment of free beauty). 
3.) Or one turns one's attention to aesthetic ideas as a source for poetic beauty. 
Now, Kant himself held that poetry is the highest art form, precisely due to its 
capacity for expressing aesthetic ideas. Having pointed this out, however, 
does not allow us to declare, "Feierabend!" For this point leads to the fol­
lowing conclusion: namely, that poetry can, generally speaking, only be 
beautiful due to aesthetic ideas, and not due to the free beauty of its (spatio-
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temporal) form. In other words, poetry, on Kant's theory, would not be merely 
the art form most capable of expressing aesthetic ideas, it would indeed be the 
only art form which can be beautiful by no other means than aesthetic ideas. 
And this clarification is one which Kant, so far as I am aware, never spelled 
out, nor am I sure that he realized it. 
Kiesewetter's book provides indirect evidence that this special status of poetry has 
been overlooked. He does indeed discuss aesthetic ideas, and does specifically 
use poetic examples to illustrate them, but his discussion of aesthetic ideas only 
appears much later in the book, long after he has already gone through his 20-
page buffet of poetic beauty. 
Ultimately, y ielding to the temptation to eat of Adickes's forbidden fruit 
(namely, reading Kiesewetter) has led to a sharpening of the question, if poetry 
can be beautiful on Kant's theory, how exactly, and in how many ways, can it be 
beautiful? Along similar lines, it also sharpens another question: if it is aesthetic 
ideas which allow poetry to have beautiful form, of what, exactly, would the 
beautiful form of an aesthetic idea consist? 
